Colombia: Central de Inversiones SA (CISA) by Engbith, Lily S & Leon Hoyos, Manuel
The Journal of Financial Crises 
Volume 3 Issue 2 
2021 
Colombia: Central de Inversiones SA (CISA) 
Lily S. Engbith 
Yale University 
Manuel Leon Hoyos 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises 
 Part of the Economic History Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Finance and Financial 
Management Commons, Macroeconomics Commons, Policy History, Theory, and Methods Commons, 
and the Public Administration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Engbith, Lily S. and Leon Hoyos, Manuel (2021) "Colombia: Central de Inversiones SA (CISA)," The Journal 
of Financial Crises: Vol. 3 : Iss. 2, 497-511. 
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol3/iss2/24 
This Case Study is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Financial Crises and 




Colombia: Central de Inversiones SA (CISA)1 
 
Lily S. Engbith2 
Manuel León Hoyos3 
 
  Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 
June 23, 2021 
Abstract 
Colombia began 1999 amidst a deep recession, caused in part by financial and trade sector 
liberalization and exacerbated by an unexpectedly sudden appreciation of the peso. 
Nonperforming loans (NPLs) amounted to more than 14% of total loans, up from 8% in 
1998. Colombian authorities thus decided to implement a three-year economic recovery 
program in late 1999. As part of the government’s strategy, banks slated for 
recapitalization were compelled to transfer or write off their NPL portfolios to Central de 
Inversiones SA (CISA), a public special purpose vehicle acquired by the deposit guarantee 
fund Fogafín in September 2000 for the management and disposal of bad assets. From 
October to December 2001, Fogafín capitalized CISA with a total of COP 520 billion ($296.1 
million) in public funds. Between 2001 and 2007, CISA purchased COP 5.6 trillion in bad 
assets from seven public banks, Fogafín, and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, 
raising in cash more than COP 3.2 trillion through the disposition of assets. Upon the 
conclusion of its crisis-era operations, the Ministry of Finance acquired CISA from Fogafín 
in December 2007.   
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At a Glance  
The 1990s marked a decade of political and 
economic volatility for Colombia, beginning 
with government efforts to liberalize the 
country’s trade and financial sectors. 
Although authorities expected the opening 
of the trade system to produce real 
depreciation of the Colombian peso (COP), 
sharp increases in public expenditures and 
an accompanying oil boom led to a sudden 
real appreciation. These events, combined 
with rapid growth of monetary aggregates 
and credit, a real estate bubble, and weak 
supervisory practices and regulatory 
forbearance, had by 1998 landed Colombia 
in a severe recession (IMF 2001). Economic 
indicators demonstrated as much: while 
production had contracted by 3.1% in the 
last quarter of 1998, unemployment levels 
exceeded 15%, and inflation rates soared 
past 35% (Fogafín 2000). Nonperforming 
loans (NPLs) amounted to more than 14% of 
total loans, up from 8% in 1998. The 
majority of these NPLs were in state-owned 
institutions, whose NPL ratios reached an 
average of 25% in 1999 (Uribe 2000).  
To combat further economic fallout, the 
Colombian government decided to 
implement a three-year economic recovery 
program in late 1999. Aided by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World 
Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, 
and Development Bank of Latin America, 
Colombian authorities undertook a series of 
interventions that included capitalization 
lines for public banks, resolution and 
restructuring measures for unviable banks 
and other financial institutions, and a bevy 
of other rescue measures related to debtor 
law and housing reform (IMF 2001; Morrison 2000; Fogafín 2001). According to Heenan et 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To “recover the largest possible 
proportion of the value of the nonperforming assets 
withdrawn from public entities” (Fogafín 2009)  
 
Launch dates   Announcement:  September 
2000 (CISA acquired by 
Fogafín) 
 
First transfer: October 
2000 
Wind-down date December 2007  
Size and type of NPL 
problem 
14% by the end of 1999 
(Fogafín 2009) 
Consumer loans, 
commercial portfolios, and 
mortgage obligations 
(Gonzalez 2000) 
Program size Not specified at outset 
Eligible institutions  Public financial institutions 
and select government 
entities including Fogafín, 
Fogacoop, and the Ministry 
of Finance and Public Credit 
(CONPES 2007; Fogafín 
2000) 
Open and closed bank 
Usage Acquired about COP 5.6 
trillion in NPLs from nine 
public financial institutions 
between 2000 and 2007 
(Fogafín 2009) 
Outcomes COP 3.2 trillion recovered 
as of 2007 (CONPES 2007) 
Ownership structure Government owned 
Notable features Created as an SPV of 
Fogafín 
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al. (2007), the government allocated a total of COP 6.1 billion ($3.5 million)4 for its rescue 
program.  
As a prerequisite for recapitalization, both private and state-owned banks were required 
by the government to transfer their NPL portfolios to Central de Inversiones SA (CISA), a 
public special purpose vehicle (SPV) acquired by the deposit guarantee fund Fogafín in 
September 2000 for the management and disposal of bad assets (Resolution 006 1999; 
Heenan et al. 2007; Fogafín 2001).5 Banks could either write off their portfolios of NPLs in 
accordance with Resolution 006 or transfer them to CISA. Contracted international auditing 
firms were responsible for drawing up the final settlement terms (Fogafín 2009). CISA was 
designated as a public company that would operate under a private law regime, facilitating 
the sales of foreclosed assets acquired from the public banks in accordance with Resolution 
006 of June 1999 and Article 91 of Law 795 of 2003 (Resolution 006 1999; Heenan et al. 
2007). According to CISA’s former Vice President of Portfolio, Wilson Sánchez Hernández, 
this designation was necessary because it allowed CISA to sell its assets at a discount using 
a predetermined cost-benefit analysis. Its ultimate mandate was to monetize the NPL 
portfolios and transfer the proceeds to the National Treasury (Villegas 2014).  
Because CISA was funded exclusively by resources from the Public Banking Reserve Fund 
and Deposit Insurance Reserve Fund (administered by Fogafín), it was not authorized to 
handle NPLs of private institutions or nonfinancial public-sector entities. Participation was 
therefore limited to public credit institutions, the deposit guarantee fund Fogafín, the 
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, and the cooperative entities guarantee fund 
Fogacoop. In addition to the removal of NPLs from distressed public banks, Colombian 
authorities empowered CISA to act as the sole asset management company for all public 
entities; for instance, it was empowered to remove and manage government-owned NPLs, 
such as real estate assets owned by the Ministry of Trade (CONPES 2007; Villegas 2014).  
The Board of Directors of Fogafín was responsible for selecting eligible assets. The 
determination was based on the assets of the most recent balance sheet submitted to the 
Banking Superintendency (Resolution 006 1999). A separate management commission was 
responsible for dealing with NPLs that were more difficult to transfer and manage due to 
“their characteristics or the nature of the entity” (CONPES 2007). For example, Fogafín was 
unable to transfer nonproductive assets in the form of convertible bonds during the 
complicated liquidation of Banco del Estado (World Bank 2002). 
In October and November 2000, Fogafín capitalized CISA with COP 267 billion (Fogafín 
2001). Half of this funding was dedicated to the purchase of NPLs associated with the 
restructuring of Bancafé6, while the other half was used for a more complex acquisition of 
 
4 In 1999, $1.00 = COP 1756.23 (World Bank).  
5 CISA was founded in 1975 as a subsidiary of Banco Central Hipoterico (BCH), a major state bank that 
monopolized the Colombian mortgage sector (CONPES 2009). To carry out its NPL operations, the Colombian 
government paid BCH and Compañia Central de Seguros SA a total of COP 6.0 billion to acquire 99.99% of 
shares in CISA (Fogafín 2009). Because Colombia lacked an adequate market for the absorption of NPLs from 
failing public banks, CISA’s acquisition was considered to be a necessary step in the cleanup process (Heenan 
et al. 2007). 
6 This funding corresponded to 50% of the total COP 600 billion in NPLs on Bancafé’s balance sheet; the 
remaining 50% was later paid to the bank using proceeds from asset recovery (Fogafín 2001).  
499
Colombia: Central de Inversiones Engbith and Leon Hoyos
 
 
6,400 real estate portfolios from Granahorrar, Banco Central Hipotecario (BCH), and Banco 
del Estado (Fogafín 2001; Gonzalez 2000). A second capitalization of COP 253 billion 
followed in December, this time in connection with the cleanup of BCH. Using these 
additional funds, CISA was able to acquire NPLs from BCH in two rounds, the first totaling 
COP 1 trillion and the second COP 186 billion (Fogafín 2001). Between 2000 and 2007, 
CISA purchased COP 5.6 trillion in bad assets from seven public banks, Fogafín, and the 
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (Table 1) (Fogafín 2009).7 
Table 1: Nonperforming Asset Purchases Made by CISA between 2000–2007 
Entity Acquired Assets Gross Value 
Bancafé 
Loans, trusts, and real estate 1.82 
BCH 
Loans and real estate 1.33 
IFI 
Loans and real estate 0.56 
Granahorrar 
Loans and real estate 0.66 
Fogafín 
Loans and real estate 0.33 
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit 




Loans, trusts, and real estate 0.45 
Banestado 
Loans and real estate 0.39 
Total 
 5.61 
Note: Figures in billions of pesos  
Source: Fogafín 2009. 
The passage of Law 795 on January 3, 2003 allowed CISA to streamline the contracting 
process for the disposition of NPLs acquired (Heenan et al. 2007). This management 
strategy was outlined in the document CONPES 3493 of October 2007 and formalized in 
Decree 4819 of December 2007; the latter named CISA the Technical Secretariat of the 
Public Assets Management Commission (Decree 4819 2007).  
Throughout its crisis-era operations, CISA disposed of its assets through public sales to 
international investors, local banks, and national collection agents (CONPES 2007). CISA 
contacted the debtors of the largest public banks—Bancafé, Granahorrar, BCH, and Banco 
del Estado—to reach payment agreements through debt restructuring (Gonzalez 2000). 
Debtors that did not comply were subject to legal proceedings and, if applicable, lost their 
properties (Gonzalez 2000).  
 
7 The nine public banks were Bancafé, Banco Central Hipotecario, Instituto de Fomento Industrial (IFI), 
Granahorrar, Fogafín, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, Banco Agrario, Caja Agraria, and Banco del 
Estado (FOGAFIN 2009). According to CISA’s former Vice President of Portfolio, Wilson Sánchez Hernández, 
neither Fogafín nor the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit held assets on its balance sheet; Table 1 reflects 
small volumes of bad assets that passed through the institutions as part of the transfer process.   
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CISA auctioned off the last of its bad assets on June 15, 2007, selling five loan portfolios and 
the remainder of its real estate properties for a nominal value of COP 2.6 trillion ($1.4 
billion) (BNA 2007). The portfolios comprised 186,000 unrecoverable loans with COP 2.4 
trillion in outstanding value (Dow Jones 2007). Investors were required to pay COP 60 
million to participate in the one-offer, winner-take-all event (BNA 2007). The base price for 
CISA’s auction was determined by the relative probabilities of loan recovery (Dow Jones 
2007). This final sale reduced CISA’s assets under management by more than 90% 
(CONPES 2007). 
Between its first operation in October 2001 and the final auction in June 2007, CISA raised 
in cash more than COP 3.2 trillion through the sale of 10,227 properties and the 
management of more than 133,000 portfolio obligations (CONPES 2007; Dow Jones 2007). 
The National Council for Economic and Social Policy (CONPES) wrote in 2007 that the 
favorable results that the entity had been presenting in recent years—the culmination of 
the process of reorganization and strengthening of the public banking system—made it 
possible to foresee the completion of the work assigned to CISA.  
The Ministry of Finance and Public Credit acquired CISA from Fogafín in December 2007, 
marking the conclusion of the SPV’s crisis-era operations (CONPES 2007).   
 
Summary Evaluation 
The main indicators of economic health, such as solvency, profitability, portfolio quality, 
and portfolio coverage, presented positive trends in Colombia’s banking sector beginning 
in 2001 (Heenan et al. 2007).  Although slow in the beginning, CISA made progress in the 
gradual sale and reduction of assets acquired from public banks (World Bank 2003; Banco 
de la República 2001). A 2003 World Bank assessment concluded that CISA had “paralleled 
the efforts of private banks in active debt recovery and loss mitigation.” Additionally, a 
Banco de la República Board of Directors Report reported in 2001 that “through the wind 
up of the BCH [restructuring] and the transfer of impaired assets to a Fogafín affiliate, CISA, 
[the public financial sector] was able to reduce its impaired assets by nearly 50%.” CISA’s 
former Vice President of Portfolio, Wilson Sánchez Hernández, contends that CISA’s work 
has been underappreciated and that it contributed immensely to crisis recovery efforts. 
Additionally, he notes that its asset disposition activities created a ready industry for NPLs 
and encouraged foreign interest in the Colombian market. Still, Heenan et al. concluded in 
2007 that despite interest from investors, there were “obstacles that [prevented] a 
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Central de Inversiones S.A.:  Colombia Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$98.4 billion in 1998 
$86.2 billion in 1999 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$2,566 in 1998 
$2,210 in 1999 
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt)  











Size of banking system  
Data not available for 1998 
Data not available for 1999 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP  
34.2% in 1998 
32.6% in 1999 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system  
96.3% in1998 
93.7% in 1999  
5-bank concentration of banking system  
76.9% in 1998 
83.8% in 1999  
Foreign involvement in banking system 
6% in 1998 
22% in 1999 
Government ownership of banking system 
37% in 1998 
18% in 1999 
Existence of deposit insurance 
Yes in 1998 
Yes in 1999 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank 
Deposit Insurance Dataset; Cull, Martinez Peria, and Verrier 2018. 
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Key Design Decisions  
1. Part of a package: Colombian authorities acquired CISA in 2000 to remove NPLs 
from distressed financial institutions slated for recapitalization or 
nationalization.    
The Colombian government and Fogafín adopted separate strategies to assist the public 
and private financial sectors. Public credit institutions and banks were compelled by the 
government to transfer their NPLs to CISA as a prerequisite for recapitalization (Fogafín 
2000). The public banks that transferred NPLs to CISA were recapitalized by Fogafín 
(Fogafín 2009).  
Private-sector financial institutions were required to write off nonperforming assets that 
would lead to negative equity. The shareholders were required to recapitalize the bank, but 
because of the economic conditions at the time, this was considered to be infeasible in the 
short term. Fogafín thus provided credit lines and recapitalized the private financial 
institutions (Fogafín 2000). According to CISA’s former Vice President of Portfolio, Wilson 
Sánchez Hernández, Fogafín liquidated private banks that had not recovered and 
proceeded to transfer their remaining assets to CISA.  
The Colombian government also passed the Economic Emergency Decree and Housing Law, 
a resolution and restructuring program to deal with “unviable entities” and other 
assistance programs for mortgage debtors and financial institutions (Fogafín 2009).  
2. Legal authority: CISA derived its authority from the legal regimes set forth in 
Resolution 006 of June 1999, Article 91 of Law 795 on Financial Reform of 2003, 
and Decree 4819 of 2007.  
CISA was given immediate legal authority to acquire and manage NPLs when the 
Colombian legislature modified the banking law with Resolution 006 in June 1999. Apart 
from adopting closed-bank resolution measures to strengthen the stability of the financial 
sector, the amendment allowed CISA to facilitate the sales of foreclosed assets acquired 
from public banks (Resolution 006 1999). According to former CISA Vice President of 
Portfolio Sánchez Hernández, this legal designation was necessary because it allowed CISA 
to sell its assets at a discount using a predetermined cost-benefit analysis.    
Resolution 006 also provided authority for recapitalization and reorganization of private 
and public financial institutions (Fogafín 2000). The Colombian authorities also allowed 
CISA to streamline the contracting process for the management and disposition of assets 
with the issuance of Article 91 of Law 795 of 2003 on financial reform (Heenan et al. 2007). 
These changes were formalized in 2007 with the implementation of Decree 4819 (Decree 
4819 2007).   
3. Special powers: It appears that the Colombian authorities modified an existing 
law to allow CISA to manage and dispose of its assets more efficiently.  
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The issuance of Article 91 of Law 795 of 2003 on financial reform again changed the legal 
framework under which CISA operated, allowing it to utilize a more efficient process for 
the management and disposition of assets. CISA thus began to operate under a private law 
regime, despite its status as a publicly owned entity (Heenan et al. 2007). The new law 
permitted it to use securitization to improve and accelerate disposal options. CISA was 
authorized to take on trustee functions in addition to the traditional asset management 
functions (World Bank 2002). These changes were formalized only with the 
implementation of Decree 4819 in 2007, under which the government assigned CISA the 
responsibility of acting as the Technical Secretariat of the Intersectoral Commission for the 
Management of Public Fixed Assets (Decree 4819 2007). This new title allowed CISA to 
implement commercial structures that would streamline the reallocation of assets between 
public entities and private investors (CONPES 2007).   
4. Mandate: The Colombian government acquired CISA in 2000 to act as a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) for the acquisition, management, and maximal recovery of 
NPLs and real estate from public financial institutions. 
In addition to managing and disposing of bad assets from distressed public banks, 
Colombian authorities empowered CISA to remove and manage government-owned NPLs, 
such as real estate owned by the Ministry of Trade. The ultimate purpose of the SPV, at 
least at the time of the 1990s financial crisis, was to monetize the assets and transfer them 
to the National Treasury (Villegas 2014).  
5. Ownership structure: CISA was established in 1975 as a mixed-economy 
commercial company associated with the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. It 
was later acquired by the deposit insurance guarantee fund of Colombia, Fogafín, 
through Resolution 006 of 1999.  
CISA was created in 1975 as a subsidiary of Banco Central Hipotecario (BCH), a major state 
bank that had a monopoly in the mortgage sector (Fogafín 2001). BCH had been founded in 
1932 with the purpose of purchasing bad loans from mortgage and commercial banks 
(Uribe 2000). Prior to the Fogafín acquisition, CISA had been carrying out similar 
resolution and recovery operations, but at a much smaller scale (Fogafín 2001).  
In September 2000, Fogafín paid COP 6 billion to acquire 99.99% of shares in CISA from 
Compañia Central de Seguros SA and BCH (Fogafín 2009).  
6. Governance/administration: Although the government allowed CISA to function 
under the private law regime, the State retained full supervisory powers over its 
operations.   
According to former CISA Vice President of Portfolio Sánchez Hernández, the SPV was 
administered by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit but also reported to Fogafín, the 
latter of which was responsible for oversight (Fogafín 2001). Heenan et al. (2007) write 
that CISA was subject to a “permanent and necessary dependence” on the executive branch, 
ensuring that its objectives were in “constant alignment” with public banking system 
policy. For example, the president of Colombia was charged with the task of appointing the 
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president of CISA (Heenan et al. 2007). CISA’s operational structure was set up such that it 
had a “Ministry” that would outsource work in order to respond immediately to changes in 
asset inventories. The Board of Directors was responsible for confirming and approving 
valuation models to price assets (CONPES 2007). According to Sánchez Hernández, the 
Minister of Finance and Public Credit, or a representative from the department, acted as the 
President of CISA; the rest of the Board comprised two Fogafín employees and two private 
sector members.  
Prior to asset transfer, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit required participating 
institutions to sign a management agreement that incorporated a standing evaluation 
system for ensuring the efficient and maximal recovery of assets (CONPES 2007).   
7. Size: The Colombian government did not preannounce a limit to CISA’s 
operational capacity.  
Between 2001 and 2007, CISA purchased a total of COP 5.6 trillion in nonperforming assets 
from nine public banks and credit institutions (Fogafín 2009).  
8. Funding sources: CISA’s crisis operations were entirely funded by the 
government.   
In October and November 2000, Fogafín capitalized CISA with COP 267 billion, which 
corresponded to 50% of the purchase value of the NPLs associated with the restructuring 
of Bancafé. A second capitalization of COP 253 billion followed in December, this time in 
connection with the cleanup of BCH (Fogafín 2001).  
It appears that CISA was funded by a combination of public bank bonds issued by Fogafín, 
tax revenues, and resources from the Public Banking Reserve Fund and the Deposit 
Insurance Reserve Fund (Fogafín 2000; CONPES 2007).  
Fogafín initially issued bonds worth COP 3 trillion in 1999. The bonds bore an interest rate 
equivalent to the 90-day DTF (benchmark) rate of 20% and carried maturities of two, four, 
six, eight, and 10 years (Fogafín 2000; Rowland 2006). They were used to fund the public 
financial sector restructuring program, which included recapitalization and the purchase of 
NPLs by CISA (Fogafín 2000).   
To resolve ongoing liquidity issues in connection with these bonds, Fogafín’s Board of 
Directors also approved repurchase operations for the public banks, with an initial quota of 
COP 250 billion and a final quota of COP 350 billion (Fogafín 2001).  
Additional funding for the public-sector restructuring came with the passage of Decree 
2514 in December 1999, as the government was able to allocate to Fogafín COP 600 billion 
in funds collected under the Financial Transaction Tax (Fogafín 2000). 
9. Eligible institutions: All public financial institutions were eligible for 
participation.  
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Because CISA was funded in part by resources from the Public Banking Reserve Fund and 
the Deposit Insurance Reserve Fund (administered by Fogafín), it was not authorized to 
handle the NPLs of private institutions or nonfinancial public-sector entities. Participation 
was therefore limited to public credit institutions, the deposit guarantee fund Fogafín, the 
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, and the cooperative entities guarantee fund 
Fogacoop (CONPES 2007). According to former CISA Vice President of Portfolio Sánchez 
Hernández, private banks that needed assistance with their NPLs or nonperforming real 
estate assets (such as Bancafé and Granahorrar) were nationalized by the government 
prior to transfer. 
Additionally, public financial institutions were required to certify that they were carrying 
out the “necessary steps for recovery,” including the initiation of “administrative actions 
against the officials who caused such deterioration” (CONPES 2007).  
10. Eligible assets: Consumer loans, commercial portfolios, and mortgage obligations 
of distressed public financial institutions were eligible for transfer to, or write-off 
by, CISA.  
The Board of Directors of Fogafín was responsible for selecting eligible assets. The 
determination was based on the assets of the most recent balance sheet submitted to the 
Banking Superintendency. CISA was not restricted to specific loan types, as it acquired 
consumer, commercial, and mortgage loans (Gonzalez 2000). These loans had ratings of C, 
D, or E, all of which indicated that the debtors were delinquent and that the loans were of 
the lowest quality (Resolution 006 1999; Gonzalez 2000). According to former CISA Vice 
President of Portfolio Sánchez Hernández, these ratings were based on the Basel Accords.  
To further strengthen the balance sheets of public entities, NPLs could also be written off in 
accordance with the criteria defined in Resolution 006 of 1999 (Fogafín 2001). 
A separate management commission was responsible for dealing with assets that were 
more difficult to transfer and manage due to “their characteristics or the nature of the 
entity” (CONPES 2007). For example, Fogafín was unable to transfer nonproductive assets 
in the form of convertible bonds during the complicated liquidation of Banestado (World 
Bank 2002).   
11. Acquisition mechanics: Eligible public financial institutions transferred NPLs to 
CISA in exchange for a combination of public banking capitalization bonds issued 
by Fogafín and proceeds from the recovery operations.  
In exchange for the NPLs, CISA immediately paid 50% of the balance in public banking 
capitalization bonds issued by Fogafín; the remaining 50% was paid at a later date using 
proceeds from the recovery of those same assets (Fogafín 2001).  
Unproductive assets were either written off in accordance with Resolution 006 of 1999 or 
transferred to CISA for management and disposal (Fogafín 2001). Fogafín also retained a 
number of international auditing firms to determine the parameters of NPL transfer 
(Fogafín 2000). 
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12. Acquisition pricing: The Board of Governors of CISA was responsible for applying 
the valuation models to determine the pricing of assets.  
The Board of Directors of CISA was required to ensure that the pricing methodology 
aligned with the general guidelines issued by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit 
(CONPES 2007).  
It is not clear if CISA applied a uniform valuation and pricing method to the acquisition of 
assets from each public financial institution. For example, CISA purchased assets from 
Bancafé at 66% of book value, or COP 600 billion, as the book value of Bancafé’s 
nonperforming assets was COP 900 billion. Bancafé was required to provide for the 
remaining 33% of the transferred portfolio. After the transfer, Fogafín recapitalized 
Bancafé, provided a capital guarantee, and allowed it to access the repurchase agreement 
operation (Fogafín 2001).  
13. Recovery and disposal: Apart from selling the assets at auction, it appears that 
the Colombian government authorized CISA to accelerate NPL disposition 
through a variety of methods, including the use of trust instruments for asset 
transfer and private contracts. 
Law 795 on Financial Reform, passed by the legislature in 2003, empowered CISA to 
engage in “enhanced” asset management procedures and exercise trustee functions when 
administering contracts (World Bank 2003).  
Prior to disposal, CISA required financial institutions to certify that they carried out all 
necessary steps for recovery and, if necessary, that they had initiated appropriate 
administrative actions against all parties responsible for the deterioration in asset quality 
(CONPES 2007). 
CISA reached agreements with the debtors of Bancafé, Granahorrar, BCH, and Banco del 
Estado in order to resolve their credit situations. For some debtors, CISA attempted to 
arrange a debt restructuring based on the debtor’s ability to pay. The restructuring 
arrangements varied across debtors, as CISA could offer a debtor the opportunity to deliver 
a property with a lower value than that of the outstanding loan. However, CISA did not 
have a one-size-fits-all formula for debt restructuring, and debtors that did not comply with 
debt restructuring or repayment faced more severe legal proceedings or saw their 
properties repossessed. Once those loans were managed through debt restructuring plans 
that corresponded to the debtors’ payment ability, CISA offered them for private sale or to 
investors who specialized in distressed debt (Gonzalez 2000).   
CISA auctioned the last of the NPL portfolios on June 15, 2007, for a nominal amount of COP 
2.6 trillion. The auction was conducted as a one-offer, winner-take-all event at which the 
minimum base price for the NPLs was determined by the possibility of recovery (BNA 
2007; Dow Jones 2007). The government would decline to sell if the offers did not reach 
this reference price (Dow Jones 2007). A number of global investment banks, including 
Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, and a consortium made up of Citigroup 
and Merrill Lynch, presented offers (Reuters 2007).  
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14. Timeframe: Colombian authorities did not initially specify a timeframe for CISA’s 
crisis-related operations.  
CISA continues to operate as of the writing of this case, though its mandate and objectives 
are no longer focused on resolving bad debt from the 1998–1999 financial crisis. In a 
report published in 2007, the National Council for Economic and Social Policy (CONPES) 
recommended that CISA transfer its profits to Fogafín by October 2007 and restructure 
under the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit by December of that same year. CONPES 
also requested that the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit establish an “adequate” 
corporate governance structure under which CISA could continue to operate after its crisis 
operations wound down, beginning in the first quarter of 2008 (CONPES 2007).  
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